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Abstract:  We examine the effect on inequality of increasing one income, and 
show that for two wide classes of indices a benchmark income level or position 
exists, dividing upper from lower incomes, such that if a lower income is raised, 
inequality falls, and if an upper income is raised, inequality rises. We provide a 
condition on the inequality orderings implicit in two inequality indices under which 
the one has a lower benchmark than the other for all unequal income distributions. 
We go on to examine the effect on the same indices of simultaneously increasing one 
income and decreasing another higher up the distribution, deriving results which 
quantify the extent of the “bucket leak” which can be tolerated without negating the 
beneficial inequality effect of the transfer. Our results have implications for the 
inequality impacts of different income growth patterns, and of redistributive 
programmes (leaky or not), which are briefly discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 In an unequal two-person society, the effect on inequality of increasing one of the two incomes is 
clear: inequality falls if we increase the lower income of the two, and rises if we increase the upper 
income. With more than two people, the effect on inequality of increasing one income is very much less 
clear, and has not, to our knowledge, been studied closely. We obtain a range of definitive results here, 
showing that the insight from the two-person society carries over in essence to inequality indices, if not 
to the Lorenz configuration. Namely, if a low income is raised, inequality falls, and if a high income is 
raised, inequality rises; and there is a specific income level, or position in the distribution, determined 
by the particular inequality index one is using, which divides these effects. We shall call this the 
“benchmark” income or position in what follows.  
 A condition between two inequality orderings, represented by indices, emerges which, if satisfied, 
ensures that the one index has an always lower benchmark than the other, whatever the income 
distribution to which both are applied. We believe this condition to be new; it evinces a Rawlsian-type 
measure which we call the “lower tail concern” of an inequality ordering.   
  We go on to examine the effect of simultaneously increasing one income and decreasing another 
higher up the distribution. We already know, of course, that a pure rich-to-poor transfer must reduce 
inequality, but we are curious about the extent of the “leak” which might be tolerated, having taken $1 
from a person, and before giving the proceeds to another person further down the distribution, without 
negating the beneficial inequality effect of the transfer. Our analytics enable us to study this “leaky 
bucket” issue closely, and we uncover some perhaps surprising properties. If a transfer is made from 
someone above the benchmark to someone below, inequality falls as a result of the first part of this 
transfer; and again as a result of the second part; a leak of more than 100% could be tolerated in such a 
case (i.e. money taken from both). If the donor and recipient are both on the same side of the 
benchmark, there is a range of possibilities. The intuitively agreeable case, a leak of between 0% and 
100% , can arise and the percentage can be quantified. However it is also possible in this case to find 
that the leak can exceed the amount taken away, and in some circumstances the leak may even be 
negative - the recipient could receive more than the donor gives up - somebody can be adding water to 
the bucket. We believe that these results are both novel and interesting. They are quite distinct from the 
leaky bucket findings of authors such as Atkinson (1980), Jenkins (1991) and Duclos (2000) in the 
welfare context, in which, following Okun (1975, pp. 91-95), the maximum leak before a welfare loss is 
 
 - 3 - 
experienced is quantified;1 not least, such a leak cannot be negative, nor exceed 100%. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the notation and preliminaries in 
terms of which the analysis will proceed. In Section 3, we comment briefly upon the implications for 
the Lorenz curve of increasing one income, and this provides a pointer to effects on some inequality 
indices. We establish a central result here: a benchmark income or position exists for any Lorenz-
consistent inequality index. In Section 4, we examine the nature and properties of the benchmark for 
two wide classes of inequality indices, deriving explicit results for many familiar indices,2 and a general 
insight that relates the benchmark to the lower tail concern of the underlying inequality ordering. In 
Section 5, we examine the leaky bucket issue in some depth. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Notation and Preliminaries  
Let the population size be N > 2. Income distributions X = (x1 , x2 , …, xi ,…, xN ) will be assumed 
throughout to be non-decreasingly ordered, X ∈ Ω1 = {X ∈ ℜ N+  : x1 ≤ x2 ≤ …≤ xi ≤ …≤ xN}, with mean 
µ(X) ∑=
i
ixN
1 . For technical reasons we will sometimes need to restrict attention to the subsets Ω2 = 
{X ∈ ℜ N+ : x1 < x2 ≤…≤ xi ≤ …≤ xN } and Ω3 = {X ∈ ℜ N+ : x1 < x2 <…< xi <…< xN} ⊂ Ω2 ⊂ Ω1 . For an 
unequal X ∈ Ω1, let δ(X)=min{xi+1 - xi : xi ≠ xi+1} > 0 be the smallest gap between two adjacent, non-
identical incomes, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 0 < δ < δ(X) denote by X iδ the vector obtained from X by adding 
δ to the income of person i. In general, X iδ = (x1 , x2 , … xi-1 , xi + δ, xi+1 ,…, xN ) ∈ Ω1, but if xi = xi+1 = x 
then X iδ ∉ Ω1, whereas its rearrangement (x1 , x2 , … , x , x + δ, xi+2 …, xN ), in which the ranks of 
persons i and i+1 are reversed, does belong to Ω1 (and has the same Lorenz curve as X iδ ).3  
For a continuous and Schur-convex  inequality index I: ℜ N+  → ℜ+ and distribution X ∈ Ω1, and for 
1 ≤ i ≤ N and 0 < δ < δ(X), we shall denote by ∆I(xi, δ) the change in inequality caused by increasing 
the income of individual i by the amount δ: ∆I(xi, δ) = I(X iδ ) - I(X).  
 
 
                                                 
1 We shall return to the cited findings later in this paper; they concern social welfare functions based on the Atkinson index and extended 
Gini coefficient. 
2  One class includes rank-independent indices such as the coefficient of variation, mean logarithmic deviation, generalized entropy index 
and Atkinson index; the other, rank-dependent (or positional) indices such as the Gini and extended Gini coefficients.  
3 In this notation, (X
j
α )
j
β = X
j
βα+ for all j such that xj  ≠ xj+1  and for α and β suitably restricted, whilst if j > i, (X
j
δ− )
i
δ = (X
i
δ )
j
δ−  is 
the distribution obtained from X  by making a progressive transfer of δ from individual j to individual i. 
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3. General Results  
The effect on the Lorenz curve for X ∈ Ω1 of increasing one income, xi, depends on which income 
this is. If the smallest income x1 is unique, i.e. x1 < x2 (so that X ∈ Ω2 ), and if x1 is increased slightly, 
the Lorenz curve shifts upwards (just consider the effect on income shares), whilst if xN is increased, 
the Lorenz curve shifts downwards (for all X ∈ Ω1, and by similar reasoning). For 1 < i < N, and also 
for i = 1 when X∈ Ω1\ Ω2 (i.e when x1 = x2), the new Lorenz curve intersects the old one once, from 
below (again, just consider the income shares). 
What can we conclude about the effect on inequality indices of raising one income xi by an 
amount δ, where 0 < δ < δ(X)? Clearly, if X ∈ Ω2 then ∆I(x1 , δ) < 0 for all Lorenz-consistent inequality 
indices I; and ∆I(xN , δ) > 0 for all X ∈ Ω1. For 1 < i < N, and also for i = 1 when X ∈ Ω1 \ Ω2, we can 
learn something from a result of Shorrocks and Foster (1987) concerning Lorenz intersections: if xi  is 
such that ∆CV(xi , δ) > 0, where CV is the coefficient of variation, then ∆I(xi , δ) > 0 for all transfer-
sensitive relative inequality indices I.4 We return to this finding in the next section.  
 The results for the lowest and highest incomes are in fact enough to establish the existence of a 
benchmark income, dividing positive from negative inequality effects for any Lorenz-consistent 
inequality index I. It is straightforward that for all X, and for all i and j with i < j, X iδ = ((X
i
δ )
j
δ )
j
δ− = 
((X jδ )
i
δ )
j
δ− , in other words that X
i
δ is obtained from X
j
δ by a progressive transfer of δ from j to i. 
Hence for any Lorenz-consistent inequality index I, we have I(X iδ ) < I(X
j
δ ), whence ∆I(xi, δ) < ∆I(xj, 
δ), ∀ i, j = (1, 2, …, N) with i < j. Since we already know that, for X ∈ Ω2, ∆I(x1 , δ) <0 and ∆I(xN , δ) 
>0, necessarily ∃ k such that ∆I(xi , δ) ≤ 0 ⇔ xi ≤ xk. A standard continuity argument establishes the 
existence of a unique income value x*, not necessarily present in the income distribution X (but 
determined by it), dividing positive from negative inequality effects: 
 
Theorem 1  
Given any continuous, Lorenz consistent inequality index I(.), income distribution X ∈ Ω2 and 
number δ  such that 0 < δ < δ(X), there exists a unique benchmark income level x* such that ∆I(xk , δ) ≤ 
0 ⇔ xk ≤ x*. 
 
 In Figure 1, we graph the inequality effect ∆I(xi, δ) for given X and δ against the value of person 
i’s income (the one being increased) in the case of the coefficient of variation, for which this function is 
                                                 
4 The transfer sensitive inequality indices are those which adhere to the Principle of Diminishing Transfers of Kolm (1976).   
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linear.5 The benchmark level x* need not in general be equal to one of the incomes present in X, but x* 
is uniquely determined by X and the index I(.). For example, as we shall see, for the coefficient of 
variation CV(.), x* = µ(X).[1+CV(X)2] and for the Theil index T(.), x* = µ(X).eT(X). 
 
 
                          ∆CV(x, δ) 
 
 
 
 
                                    x1  x2                                                                   x*                         xN  
 
 
   
 
Figure 1: inequality effect of raising person i’s income by a small amount δ for the 
coefficient of variation, as a function of his/her income level x. 
 
 
 
4. Further analysis for two general classes of indices 
 Some inequality indices depend on income shares alone, and others depend on income shares and 
ranks. We might call such indices rank-independent and rank-dependent respectively, or non-positional 
and positional. Among the positional indices are the Gini coefficient and the extended Gini coefficients 
of Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Yitzhaki (1983). These are members of the general class of 
“linear measures” identified by Mehran (1976). Most of the familiar non-positional indices are related 
in one way or another to the generalized entropy family, shown by Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980) 
and Shorrocks (1980) to be the unique additively decomposable indices. The mean logarithmic 
deviation and Theil index belong to the generalized entropy class, and the coefficient of variation and 
Atkinson index are monotonic transformations of indices in this class. We analyze indices of the two 
types separately here, using suitable general forms and then proceeding to specific indices afterwards. 
As we shall see, Theorem 1 extends from Ω2 to Ω1 for the non-positional indices, whilst for the 
positional ones, the benchmark can be expressed as a position (rank) rather than an income level when 
X ∈ Ω3. 
 
4.1 The non-positional indices of relative inequality for the class Ω1  
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 Many non-positional indices, including all the ones we have cited, can either be written in the 
form: 
(1) J(X) = [1/N]Σi u(xi /µ(X)) 
where u: ℜ+ → ℜ+ is a twice-differentiable function such that u" does not change sign, or are 
monotonic transformations of something in this form. Let I(X) be such an inequality index; suppose 
that: 
(2) I(X) = h(J(X))  
for all X ∈ Ω1 where h: ℜ+ → ℜ+ is differentiable and such that h' does not change sign.  
 This form encompasses most of the familiar non-positional indices. For the mean logarithmic 
deviation D, set u(z) = -ln(z ) and h(J) = J. The Theil index T is given by u(z) = z ln(z) and h(J) = J. The 
generalized entropy class comprises indices E(c), c ∈ ℜ, of which E(0) = D, E(1) = T and E(c), c ≠ 0,1 
obtains when u(z) = zc and h(J) = (J-1)/[c(c-1)]. For the coefficient of variation CV, set u(z) = (z-1)2 and 
h(J) = J1/2. For the Atkinson index A(e), where e > 0 is the inequality aversion parameter, set u(z) = z1-e 
and h(J) = 1 - J1/(1-e) when e ≠1 and set u(z) = ln (z) and h(J) = 1 – eJ when e = 1. The coefficient of 
variation and Atkinson index for 0 < e ≠1 are monotonic transformations of generalized entropy 
indices: CV = √[2E(2)] and A(e) = 1 - [1 – e(1-e)E(1-e)]1/(1-e). 
 We may use the calculus to identify the benchmark income level x*. First, differentiate in (1) with 
respect to the income being increased, let this be xk to distinguish it from the generic xi : 
(3) ∂J/∂xk = 





 −+


−

∑
≠
2
k
k2
i
ki
i Nµ
x
µ
1)µ(xu'
Nµ
x
)µ(xu'
N
1  
In this, we have written µ for µ(X) to suppress unnecessary notation. Now differentiate in (2), substitute 
from (3) and rearrange: 
(4) ∂Ι/∂xk = [h'(J)/Nµ]{u'(xk /µ) - [1/N]Σi (xi /µ) u'(xi /µ)} 
For the transfer principle to hold, if lx > xj then ∂I/∂ lx  > ∂I/∂xj , that is: 
(5) lx > xj ⇒ [h'(J)]{u'( lx  /µ) - u'(xj /µ)} > 0 
whence if h'(J) > 0, u' must be monotone increasing, and if h'(J) < 0, u' must be monotone decreasing 
(recall that u″ does not change sign). Now let zi = xi/µ be normalized income and define z* by: 
(6) u′(z*) = [1/N].∑ziu′(zi) 
From (4)-(5), z* determines the benchmark income level, dividing negative from positive inequality 
effects when the relevant income is increased: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5  See on. In the case of a generic Lorenz-consistent inequality index, the graph will have curvature, its shape depending on transfer 
sensitivity and the distribution x in question.  
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Theorem 2  
 Let I be a non-positional inequality index defined as in (1)-(2) and let X ∈ Ω1. Then ∂I/∂xk >< 0 ⇔ 
xk /µ  >< z*  where z* is defined as in (6) 
 
It is now straightforward to obtain the benchmark income level for each of the familiar indices we 
have shown to be members of this non-positional class. For the mean logarithmic deviation D, for 
example, for which u(z) = -ln(z) and u′(z) = -1/z, we have from (6) that z* = 1; whilst for the Theil 
index T, for which u(z) = zln(z) and u′(z) = 1 + ln(z), we have from (6) that 1 + ln(z*) = 1 + T, or z* = 
eT. For the other indices we have enumerated, the calculations go similarly.  The results are these:  
 
Corollary  
 For the mean logarithmic deviation D, Theil index T, generalized entropy indices E(c), c ≠ 0,1, 
coefficient of variation CV and Atkinson index A(e), e > 0, and for all X ∈ Ω1 , the inequality effect of a 
small increase in income xk depends on the value of xk relative to the mean, as follows: 
(a) ∂D/∂xk >< 0 ⇔ xk /µ  >< zD = 1 
(b) ∂Τ/∂xk >< 0 ⇔ xk /µ  >< zT = Te  
(c) ∂E(c)/∂xk >< 0 ⇔ xk /µ  >< zE(c) = [1 + c(c-1)E(c)]1/(c-1)     (c ≠ 0,1)  
(d) ∂CV/∂xk >< 0 ⇔ xk /µ  >< zCV =1+CV 2 
(e) ∂A(e)/∂xk >< 0 ⇔ xk /µ  >< zA(e) = [1 - A(e)](e-1)/e  (e ≠ 1) 
(f) ∂A(1) /∂xk >< 0 ⇔ xk /µ  >< zA(1) = 1 
 
 There are some equivalences within this set of results. For example, using E(2) = (1/2)CV 2, we 
see that zE(2) = [1 + 2E(2)] = zCV. This is as it ought to be, since the two indices are monotonically 
related. It can also be shown that 
0→c
lim zE(c) = 1 = zD = zA(1) , 
1→c
lim zE(c) = Te  = zT and zA(e) = zE(1-e) for e ≠ 
1. Let us examine the benchmark zE(c) for the generalized entropy family more closely. Define mc 
= ∑
=
N
1i
c
izN
1 and Mc = {mc}1/c  as the moment of order c and mean of order c respectively in the 
distribution of the z’s. Then zE(c) = {Mc}c/(c-1) for c ≠ 0,1. The properties of Mc as a function of c, for a 
given distribution, are well-known in the statistical literature6, and can be used to derive properties of 
                                                 
6 For a proof of the properties of the mean of order c, see for example Hardy et al. (1934, chapter 1).  
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the benchmark. In particular, for any given income distribution X, zE(c) is continuous and increasing in c, 
and ranges in value from the minimum income relative to the mean, z1, to the maximum, zN: that is, zE(c) 
→ z1 as c → -∞ and zE(c) → zN  as c→ +∞. A particular consequence is that, for each person k in an 
income distribution X ∈ Ω1 there exists a unique c ∈ ℜ such that zE(c) = xk /µ: each person can be 
considered to be at the benchmark position for exactly one generalized entropy index. Figure 2, 
obtained by simulation, shows graphs of Mc and zE(c) against c for the income distribution ($200, $500, 
$800, $1100, $2400). 
 
income relative 
to the mean 
 
             
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  the generalized entropy benchmark as a function of the parameter c 
      for the income distribution ($200, $500, $800, $1100, $2400) 
 
 
We can now return to the finding in Section 3 concerning the coefficient of variation and transfer-
sensitive inequality indices. We saw there that for X ∈ Ω1 and for any k such that ∂CV/∂xk > 0, an 
increase in xk necessarily raises inequality for every transfer-sensitive index I. That is, from part (d) of 
the Corollary, if xk /µ > zCV = 1 + CV2 then ∂I/∂xk > 0. Therefore zCV is an upper bound for the 
benchmarks z* in the class of transfer-sensitive inequality indices.7 
 The function u and income distribution X together determine the benchmark income level x* for 
indices in our non-positional class according to equation (6) (and for Ω1 rather than the restricted Ω2 of 
                                                 
7  This result is consistent with our Corollary. A(e) is transfer-sensitive for all e, and E(c) is transfer sensitive for c < 2, and the 
benchmarks for these indices all exceed zCV : c < 2 ⇒ zCV > zE(c) = zA(1-c)  (as Figure 2 shows). 
1 c  0
   z1
z N
1
z E(c)  M c 
zCV
 zT
2
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Theorem 1; ties, as in Ω1 \ Ω2, are immaterial for the non-positional indices)8. Notice that the function u 
alone defines the inequality ordering induced by I, and determines the benchmark, whereas the function 
h is also needed for the definition of I.   
 Further insight into the relationship between the inequality ordering and benchmark income level 
can be gained with a simple transformation. Let  πi = zi/N, which is person i’s income share, 1 # i # N, 
and note that ∑πi = 1. Now set U(z) = u´(z) where u is the function in (1) determining the inequality 
ordering. From (6), the benchmark income relative to the mean satisfies this equation:  
(7) U(z*) = ∑ πiU(zi) = E[U(Z)]  
where Z is a risky prospect in which the return is zi with probability πi, 1 # i # N. That is, z* = x*/µ is 
the certainty equivalent of Z for the “utility function” U, in the sense of Pratt (1964). An extension of 
the Pratt theorem confirms the following result, linking the (relative) risk aversion of U, which, in terms 
of the function u defining the inequality ordering, takes the form 
(8) Pu(z) = -zu″′(z)/u″(z), 
with the position of the benchmark:9 
 
Theorem 3 
 Let I and Î be inequality indices defined as in (1)-(2) by, respectively, h and u and hˆ  and  û, 
where Pu (z) > Pû (z)  ∀z. Then for all unequal income distributions X ∈ Ω1, the benchmark income for I 
is less than that for Î :  x* < xˆ * .   
 
 The higher is the measure Pu(z) ∀z, the more confined is the lower-tail region [0,x*] in which an 
increase in a person’s income is regarded as an inequality improvement, whatever the income 
distribution. In a clear sense, then, an inequality ordering with a higher Pu-measure is “more 
Rawlsian”.10 Rather than introduce a cumbersome word, “Rawlsianity”, for the measure Pu(z) as a  
characteristic of the inequality ordering of which I is a cardinal representation, we shall call it the 
                                                 
8 Notice that for the coefficient of variation, ∆CV(xi, δ) ≈ δ.∂CV/∂xi is linear in xi because, in (4), u’(z) = 2(z-1) in case I = CV. This 
accounts for the shape of the graph in Figure 1.  
9  For a direct proof, just follow similar steps to those in Lambert’s (2001, theorem 4.1) proof of the Pratt theorem. Namely,  define Û by 
Û(z) = û´(z), and let  the “inequality aversion” measures for the “utilities” U and Û be qÛ(z) = -zÛ″(z)/Û´(z) and qU(z) = -zU″ (z)/U´(z),  
so that PÛ(z) = qÛ(z) and similarly for U. By assumption û″ = Û' and u″ = U' do not change sign. Define a function ø by Û(z) = ø[U(z)] 
 z, so that ø' < 0 if and only if U' and Û' have opposite signs. Then qÛ(z) = qU(z) - zøΟ[U(z)]U'(z)/ø'[U(z)]. Assuming qÛ(z) < qU(z)  z, as 
in the theorem, øΟ < 0 if  Û' < 0 and øΟ > 0 if Û' > 0.  Now apply Jensen’s inequality: Û( xˆ */µ) = E[Û(Z)] = E[ø(U(Z))] < ø(E[U(Z)]} = 
ø[U(x*/µ)] = Û(x*/µ) if Û´ < 0 and Û( xˆ */µ) = E[Û(Z)] = E[ø(U(Z))] > ø(E[U(Z)]} = ø[U(x*/µ)] = Û(x*/µ) if Û´ > 0. In either case, x* < 
xˆ * , as the theorem claims. 
10 Since its introduction in 1971, Rawls’ difference principle has overwhelmingly been interpreted as expressing concern (in either 
inequality or welfare terms) solely with the fortunes of the worst-off individual (or set of individuals if there is equality at the very 
bottom). Yet Rawls himself clearly referred to “the least advantaged segment” (ibid, p. 98, italics added), this segment being demarcated  
either  by a relative income, or by the average income of those occupying one of the less-fortunate social roles. 
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“lower tail concern” in what follows.11  
 All the specific indices we have been considering in fact have constant lower tail concern. This is 
because they all represent inequality orderings implicit in generalized entropy indices, for which u(z) = 
zc whence PE(c)(z) = 2-c, ∀z. It follows from Theorem 3 that the benchmark income for E(c) is an 
increasing function of c whatever the income distribution X, as evidenced in Figure 3 for a specific 
income distribution. It can be checked directly, by inspecting the relevant u-functions, that for the mean 
logarithmic deviation, PD(z) = 2, ∀z; for the Theil index, PT(z) = 1, ∀z; for the coefficient of variation, 
PCV(z) = 0, ∀z; and for the Atkinson index, PA(e)(z) = e+1, ∀z. The configuration of benchmarks for any 
two of the inequality indices we have catalogued can thus be ascertained, whatever the income 
distribution, by a simple comparison of scalar magnitudes.  Notice that the inequality orderings with 
(constant) negative lower tail concern are precisely those represented by the generalized entropy indices 
E(c) for c > 2. This ties in with a remark of Shorrocks (1980, p. 623), that the indices E(c), c > 2 “show 
little concern for equalization, except possibly among the very rich”. In fact, within the general class of 
non-positional indices satisfying (1)-(2), the sub-class having positive lower tail concern are precisely 
those which satisfy Kolm’s (1976) Principle of Diminishing Transfers.12 
 
4.2 The positional indices of relative inequality for the class Ω3 
 Here we shall consider inequality indices in which people’s incomes are weighted according to 
their positions in the distribution. Specifically, let M(X) take the form 
(9) M(X) = [1/N]. ∑i w(i)xi /µ 
for X ∈ Ω3, where w: ℜ → ℜ is such that ∑i w(i) = 0 and w(i+1) > w(i) for i = 1,2,... N-1. 
 This specification covers the Gini coefficient G, for which wG(i) = (2i – N – 1)/N, the extended 
Gini coefficient G(ν), ν > 1, of Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983) and Yitzhaki (1983), for which 
wG(ν)(i) = N.{[(N-i)/N]ν - [(N-i+1)/N]ν}+ 1 (the case ν = 2 being that of the ordinary Gini coefficient),13 
                                                 
11 There is a formal link with Kimball’s (1990) concept of “prudence” in the uncertainty context. We refrain from calling Pu(z)  
“downside inequality aversion”, as this would be inconsistent with Modica and Scarsini’s (2002) measure in the uncertainty context of 
downside risk aversion, which, in absolute form, is -u″′(z)/u′(z). We also refrained from calling Pu(z) “downside-mindedness”, however 
apt, as this concept belongs to Wilthien (1999). 
12 It is readily verified, using a similar argument to the one given just after  (5), that if h′(J) > 0 then I satisfies Kolm’s principle if and 
only if u″ > 0 and u″′ < 0, and that if h′(J) < 0 then I satisfies Kolm’s principle if and only if u″ < 0 and u″′ > 0. Hence Kolm’s principle 
corresponds precisely to an everywhere positive lower tail concern.   
13 For more on the extended Gini coefficient, see Lambert (2001, chapter 5).  Note that w G(ν)(i+1) – w G(ν)(i) = [(N-i+1)/N]ν + [(N-i-
1)/N]ν  - 2[(N-i)/N]ν which can be written as 2[E(Yν) – (E(Y))ν] where Y is a random variable with realizations (N-i+1)/N and (N-i-1)/N 
each with probability ½. This is strictly positive because Yν is a convex function of Y for ν > 1. Similarly, by a slight abuse of notation, 
we have ∂[wG(ν)(i+1) – wG(ν)(i)]/∂i = -2[E(Yν-1) – (E(Y))ν-1]/N, which is negative for ν > 2, zero for ν = 2 and positive for ν < 2. G(ν) thus 
satisfies the strong version of the Positional Principle of Diminishing Transfers only for ν > 2. See on.  
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and the illfare-ranked S-Gini coefficient S(β), 0 ≤ β < 1, of Donaldson and Weymark (1980), for which 
wS(β)(i) = 1 – N.{[i/N]β - [(i-1)/N]β }. 
 Going slightly further, we shall assume that in (9), the function w: ℜ → ℜ is strictly increasing 
and twice differentable. Setting ω(p) = w(Np), so that ω : [0,1] → ℜ ascribes weights by rank, (9) 
becomes: 
(9a) M(X) = [1/N]. ∑i ω(pi)xi /µ 
in which the rank of income xi  is written as pi = i/N,  so that ω(pi) = w(i). This version of (9) exactly 
describes the class of so-called ‘linear inequality measures’ identified by Mehran (1976) and further 
studied by Yaari (1988).14    
 For X ∈ Ω3, this index is differentiable in each xi.15 Differentiating in (9), we have 
(10) ∂M/∂xk = [w(k) – M]/[Nµ] >< 0 ⇔  w(k) >< M 
We know that ∂M/∂xN > 0 from Theorem 1. Hence w(N) > M; and since ∑i w(i) = 0 by assumption, and 
w is increasing, we must have w(1) < 0. Then by continuity and monotonicity, there exists a unique real 
number k* such that w(k*) = M. Of course, k* is unlikely to be an integer. We have established the 
existence of a benchmark position for indices in the positional class: 
 
Theorem 4 
 Let M be a positional inequality index defined for X ∈ Ω3 as in (9), with w: ℜ → ℜ  continuous 
and strictly monotone increasing. Then ∂M/∂xk >< 0 ⇔  k >< k* where k* = w-1(M). 
 
 For the Gini coefficient, we have kG* = [N(1+G)+1]/2 > N/2, whence the benchmark is above 
the median (and by more, the more unequal is the distribution). Defining ∆G(xk, δ) =G(X kδ ) – G(X), 
with 0 < δ < δ(X) as earlier, we find that ∆G(xk, δ) = 2 a kδ a
N b δ b
+ −+
     where a = ∑i ixi and b = Nµ = 
                                                 
14  In the case of a continuous income distribution function F(x),  the Mehran index becomes  MF =  ∫01 xω(F(x))f(x)dx/µ  where ∫01 w(p)dp 
= 0 (see Lambert, 2001, for more on this). In this setting, the rank-weighting functions for the Gini, extended Gini and S-Gini are ωG(p) = 
2p-1, ωG(ν)(p) = 1 - ν(1-p) ν-1 and ωS(β)(p) = 1 - βpβ-1 respectively. These correspond to the discrete weighting functions wG(i), wG(ν)(i) and  
wS(β)(i) cited above, making the identification p = i/N and regarding 1/N as an infinitesimal. Chateauneuf et al. (2002) characterize the 
class of Yaari (1988) indices by a form as in (9) but with w(i) = 1 + N{f((N-i)/N) – f((N-i+1)/N)} for some function f: [0,1] → [0,1] for 
which f(0)=0, f(1) = 1 and f′(t) > 0 ∀t ∈ (0,1). For the extended Gini,we have fG(ν)(t) = tν and for the illfare ranked S-Gini, fS(β)(t) = 1 – (1-
t)β. Writing ω(p) = 1 – f ′(1-p), the functions ωG(p), ωG(ν)(p) and  ωS(β)(p) emerge, along with the general form in (9a). Notice that if we 
extend the functional forms defining G(ν) and S(β) to all non-zero parameter values, then -G(ν) belongs to our positional class for ν < 1 
and -S(β) belongs to it for β > 1. A new inequality index outlined in Wang and Tsui (2000) takes the form J(c) = sign (c-1)[G(c) - S(c)], 0 
< c ≠ 1, and hence belongs to our class too. Another class of ‘generalized Gini’ indices due to Aaberge (2001),  in which the weights 
depend on Lorenz curve values L(p) rather than positions p, does not fall within the scope of our general form in (9)-(9a).   
15 The form in (9) can be extended to Ω1, with the loss of differentiability, if the weights when xi = xi+1 are made the same for persons i 
and i+1, and equal to [w(i) + w(i+1)]/2 . Without this change, a small amount taken from person i and given to person i+1 would increase 
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∑i xi . Thus kG* = a/b can be interpreted as the income weighted average position in the distribution. 
Note in particular that ∆G(xk, δ) is linear in k and independent of the income value xk. See Figure 3, 
a Gini version of Figure 1, which shows position rather than income horizontally. 
 
 
                             ∆G(xk,δ) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              1   2                    ……                            kG*         ……          N            k 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: benchmark position for the Gini coefficient 
 
 
 For the extended Gini coefficient G(ν), the benchmark position kG(ν)* is the solution to the 
equation wν(k) = G(ν), or [(N-k+1)/N]ν - [(N-k)/N]ν = [1 - G(ν)]/N, which is difficult to obtain 
explicitly. However, an approximation to kG(ν)* can be obtained quite easily. Define a function f(q) = 
qν, so that q* = (N-kG(ν)*)/N is the solution of [1 - G(ν)]/N = f(q + 1/N) – f(q). For large N, f(q + 1/N) – 
f(q) ≈ νqν-1/N, whence q* ≈ {[1 - G(ν)]/ν}1/(ν-1) i.e. kG(ν)* ≈ N[1 – {[1 - G(ν)]/ν}1/(ν-1)]. In the case ν = 2, 
this approximation becomes kG(2)* ≈ N[1 +G]/2, whilst the true value, kG*, is [N(1+G)+1]/2 which is 
higher by ½. Hence the approximate benchmark is at most one position too high in this case. For the 
illfare-ranked S-Gini, by similar reasoning kS(β)* ≈ N{[1 - S(β)]/β}1/(β-1)].  
 A link between the lower tail concern of the inequality ordering represented by M and the 
location of the benchmark k* obtains for the positional class, just as it did for the non-positional class in 
Theorem 3. Again setting πi = zi/N as person i’s income share, and treating it as a probability, and now 
using version (9a) of the definition of M, we have from (10) that the benchmark position k* satisfies 
this equation:  
(11) ω (p*) = ∑ πi ω(pi) = E[ω(K)]  
where p* = k*/N and  K is a risky prospect in which the return is pi with probability πi, 1 #i # N. That 
is, k*/N is the certainty equivalent of K for ω, in the sense of Pratt (1964). Defining 
(12) Qω(p) = -pω″(p)/ω′(p) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
inequality, whereas the same amount taken from person i+1 and given to person i would reduce it – yet the final income distribution 
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as the lower tail concern measure for this scenario, we have the following result, paralleling Theorem 3: 
 
Theorem 5 
 Let M and Mˆ be positional inequality indices defined for X ∈ Ω3 as in (9a) by,  respectively, ω  
and ωˆ , where Qω(p) > ˆQω (p) ∀p. Then for all unequal income distributions X ∈ Ω3, the benchmark 
position is lower for M than for Mˆ :  k* <  kˆ * .   
 
 For the positional indices, lower tail concern Qω(p) is measured in terms of rank p (rather than 
relative income z), and is given by the concavity of the weighting function ω.  The higher is the 
measure Qω(p) ∀p, the more confined is the set of lower tail positions 1 ≤ k < k* in which an increase in 
a person’s income is regarded as an inequality improvement. If the population size N is large, the 
illfare-ranked S-Gini has constant (and positive) lower tail concern: QS(β)(p) = 2-β ∀p (see footnote 14). 
If we had defined Qω(p) slightly differently, as Qω*(p) = -(1-p)ω″(p)/ω′(p), which would have no effect 
on the validity of the theorem, then it would be the extended Gini that had constant lower tail concern: 
QG(ν)*(p) = ν-2. This makes evident a link between our tail concern measure and the Positional 
Principle of Diminishing Transfers, since only the extended Ginis with  ν > 2 (i.e. those with positive 
lower tail concern) satisfy this Principle (see footnote 13). In fact, within the general class of positional 
indices satisfying (9)-(9a), the sub-class having positive lower tail concern are precisely those which 
satisfy the Positional Principle of Diminishing Transfers.16 
 
5. The Leaky Bucket 
 Using all of these results, we can now address the leaky bucket issue. Suppose that, in an unequal 
distribution X, a small amount δ is taken from individual l and an amount qδ is given to individual j 
who is lower down the distribution (j < l ), where q∈ ℜ+. The effect on any differentiable inequality 
index I is readily obtained using the total differential: 
(13) dΙ  = [q∂Ι/∂xj - ∂Ι/∂ lx ].δ 
for an infinitesimally small δ. If X ∈ Ω1 then xj ≤ lx , whilst if X ∈ Ω3 (or if l  = 2 and X ∈ Ω2) then xj 
< lx . As before, we can deal with the general case of X ∈ Ω1 for the non-positional indices, but will 
                                                                                                                                                                  
would be the same in both cases.  
16 The general positional index M as defined in equations (9)-(9a) satisfies the strong version of the Positional Principle of Diminishing 
Transfers when the positive difference w(i+1) - w(i) is strictly decreasing in i, or ω″ (p) < 0 ∀p ∈ (0,1). See Mehran (1976, p. 808) and  
Chateauneuf et al. (2001, theorem 9) for more on this. Yaari’s (1988) “equality-mindedness” measure for the positional indices, which in 
our notation is = -ω′(p)/[1-ω(p)], and in the alternative notation of footnote 14 is –f ″(1-p)/f ′(1-p), is based upon a leaky bucket 
experiment: see on. 
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restrict attention to X ∈ Ω3 and 0 < δ < δ(X) for the positional ones. In both cases, the index is then 
differentiable. The value q0 for which dI = 0 reveals the information we seek about the permitted 
leakiness of the bucket for a non-adverse inequality effect: 
 (14)  q0 =
jxI(.)
xI(.)
∂∂
∂∂ l  
The  intuitively agreeable scenario, that the size of the leak would not erase completely the amount of 
income to be received by the poor, corresponds to 0 < q0 < 1, whilst the other two cases we have 
already anticipated, that the leak could exceed 100% or even be negative, correspond to q0 < 0 and q0 
>1 respectively. As we shall see, it is possible to predict the circumstances in which each of these three 
cases occurs for all inequality indices in our two classes. 
 
5.1 The non-positional indices of relative inequality  
 For an inequality index I defined as in (1)-(2), we obtain 
(15) q0 = )µ*x(u'µ)(xu'
)µ*x(u'µ)(xu'
−
−
j
l   
from (14) using (4) and (6). Since u' is monotonic, it follows that the magnitude of the permitted leak 
(which is 1-q0) depends crucially upon which side of the benchmark the donor and recipient lie:17   
 
Theorem 6 
 Let I be a non-positional inequality index defined as in (1) - (2). The fraction q0 of a small amount 
δ taken from individual l  which must reach individual j (where j < l ) for inequality neutrality depends 
upon the incomes of l  and j relative to the benchmark income x* as follows: 
(i)   x* > lx  > x j   ⇒ 0 < q0 < 1 
(ii) lx  > x* > x j   ⇒  q0 < 0 
(iii) lx  > x j > x*  ⇒  q0 > 1 
 
The magnitude of the effect on inequality, of a leaky transfer from l  to j, depends on whether q 
>
< q0 , of course, as well as on the values zj = xj /µ,  zl  = lx /µ and z* = x*/µ: for any non-positional 
index in our class, inequality increases or decreases according to the inefficiency level and the relative 
incomes of the individuals affected. Case (i), in which 0 < q0 < 1, is the one typically envisaged, and, 
                                                 
17  It is a general property that if a function g(.) is strictly monotonic, either increasing or decreasing, and if d = [g(a)-g(b)]/[g(c)-g(b)], 
where a > c, then d < 0 if a > b > c, d > 1 if a > c > b, and 0 < d < 1 if b > a > c.  
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our analytics reveal, it can occur only when both the donor and recipient are below the benchmark. In 
all other configurations of donor and recipient, the permitted leakage will either exceed the amount 
taken away (q0 < 0), so that the “recipient” may lose too, or be negative, so that the recipient may 
receive more than the donor gives up (q0 > 1) with no adverse effect on inequality.  
One can readily obtain the value of q0 for any particular index using (15) and the appropriate 
function u(.). For the mean logarithmic deviation D, qD = 
1
1
j
z 1
z 1
−
−
−
−
l ; for the Theil index T, qT =
j
ln z - T
ln z - T
l ; for 
the generalized entropy index E(c), c ≠ 0,1, qE(c) =
c-1 c-1
E(c)
c-1 c-1
j E(c)
z z
z z
−
−
l ; for the coefficient of variation CV, qCV 
= CV
CV
z
z j
z
z
−
−
l ; for the Atkinson index A(e), qA(e) = 
e e
A(e)
e e
j A(e)
z
z
z
z
− −
− −
−
−
l = qE(1-e) for 0 < e ≠1 and qA(1) = qD.  
In Table 1, we illustrate how the benchmark income level x* and maximum permitted rate of 
leakage 1 – q0 vary with inequality aversion e for the Atkinson index A(e), using the income 
distribution ($200, $500, $800, $1100, $2400) again and choosing l = 4 and j = 2. When $1 is taken 
from the person with $1100 and an amount $q is given to the person with $500, the leak $(1-q) can be 
as big as the value 1 – q0 = 1 – qA(e) shown in the table before an inequality effect judged to be adverse 
would occur. As is clear, all three cases 0 < q0 < 1, q0 < 0 and q0 > 1 of Theorem 6 arise, for different 
ranges of inequality aversion  e. In each such range  the maximum permitted rate of leakage increases 
with e.  
 
e A(e) x* 1 – qA(e) 
Theorem 6, 
case: 
0.1 0.0272 1282.1811 0.8436 
0.2 0.0546 1251.5924 0.8701 
0.3 0.0819 1220.6203 0.8967 
0.4 0.1092 1189.3367 0.9234 
0.5 0.1363 1157.8210 0.9503 
0.6 0.1632 1126.1599 0.9774 
(i) 
 
x* > x4 > x2   
 
⇒  0 < q0 < 1 
 
0.8 0.2162 1062.7796 1.0328 
1 0.2673 1000.0000 1.0909 
1.2 0.3160 938.6666 1.1535 
1.4 0.3617 879.6041 1.2230 
1.6 0.4041 823.5476 1.3033 
1.8 0.4428 771.0817 1.4001 
2 0.4778 722.6008 1.5222 
2.2 0.5092 678.2984 1.6849 
2.4 0.5370 638.1840 1.9160 
2.6 0.5615 602.1179 2.2737 
2.8 0.5831 569.8547 2.9028 
3 0.6020 541.0856 4.2955 
(ii) 
 
x4 > x* > x2 
 
⇒  q0 < 0 
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3.2 0.6186 515.4730 9.8986  
3.5 0.6398 482.2325 -6.9382 
4 0.6673 438.0625 -1.3731 
5 0.7032 378.4391 -0.3241 
6 0.7247 341.3486 -0.1117 
7 0.7387 316.5664 -0.0423 
10 0.7608 275.9386 -0.0026 
20 0.7823 234.9238 -0.0000 
(iii) 
 
x4 > x2 > x*   
 
⇒  q0 > 1 
 
  
              Table 1: The benchmark income level x* and maximum permitted rate of leakage 1-qA(e)   
  as a function of inequality aversion for the income distribution ($200, $500, 
  $800, $1100, $2400) when l = 4 and j = 2.  
 
 Figure 4 shows the maximum permitted leakage rate 1-qE(c) for the more general class of 
inequality indices E(c) as a function of the parameter c, for this same income distribution, using the 
scenario l = 4 and j = 2 of Table 1 and three others each involving the richest and/or poorest person in 
the transfer. The results for the Atkinson index A(e) for 0< e ≠1 occur for c < 1 (recall that qE(1-e) = 
qA(e)). Panel 1 replicates and extends the maximum leak values given in Table 1. It is clear from panels 
3 and 4, however, that it is not always the case for the Atkinson index that the maximum permitted leak 
increases with inequality aversion e. When the richest person is the donor, in this example the 
maximum leak decreases with e in some or all ranges. A fortiori, there can be no clear general 
relationship between the lower tail concern of an inequality ordering, as measured by Pu(z), and the 
maximum leak 1 – q0: an intuition that a more lower tail concerned inequality ordering would 
countenance bigger leaks, though tempting, must be wrong.  
 Our findings in Table 1 and Figure 4 may be set alongside those Atkinson (1980, p. 42) and 
Jenkins (1991, pp. 28-9), which relate to the maximum tolerable leak for an Atkinson index before a 
welfare loss is experienced (rather than, as here, before inequality is worsened). Because the efficiency 
aspect gets taken into account in welfare, measured  in these studies as µ[1 – A(e)], it is clear that very 
big leaks could not be tolerated; Atkinson and Jenkins found maximum permitted leaks in the range 
33%-75% for their particular numerical scenarios. 
 
5.2 The positional indices of relative inequality  
 If X ∈ Ω3 and if 0 < δ < δ(X) then the resultant income distribution after the transfer, which is 
(X l δ− )
j
qδ+ , also belongs to Ω3. Thus the form given in (9) for a positional index M(.) applies. 
Substituting from (10) into (14), the value of q0 for the index M is:  
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Figure 4:   Maximum permitted leakage rate 1-qE(c)  for the generalized entropy index E(c) as a function of c, for the scenario in Table 1 and three other scenarios         
 involving the richest and/or the poorest person in the transfer. 
Panel 1: l = 4  and  j = 2                                                                                         Panel 2: l = 3  and  j = 1  
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 Panel 3: l = 5  and  j = 2                                                                                         Panel 4: l = 5  and  j = 1  
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(16) q0 =
( )
( )
w M
w j M
−
−
l  
Now recall from Theorem 4 that the benchmark position for M is k* = w-1(M). Hence 
(17) q0 =
( ) ( *)
( ) ( *)
w w k
w j w k
−
−
l  
(compare this with (15), which expresses q0 in a similar form for the non-positional indices). The 
following results are immediate, given that w(.) is strictly increasing:  
 
Theorem 7 
 Let M be a positional inequality index defined for X ∈ Ω3 as in (9), with w: ℜ → ℜ  continuous 
and strictly monotone increasing. The fraction q0 of a small amount 0 < δ < δ(X) taken from individual 
l which must reach individual j (where j < l ) for inequality neutrality depends upon the positions of l  
and j relative to the benchmark position k* as follows: 
(i)      k* > j > l  ⇒  0 < q0 < 1 
(ii)  l  > k* > j  ⇒  q0 < 0 
(iii)    l  > j > k*  ⇒   q0 > 1 
 
 The case 0 < q0 < 1 occurs only when both the donor and recipient are positioned below the 
benchmark k*. In all other configurations, the permitted leakage will either exceed the amount taken 
away (q0 < 0), so that the “recipient” may lose too, or be negative, so that the recipient may receive 
more than the donor gives up (q0 > 1) with no adverse effect on inequality. These results are analogous 
to the ones in Theorem 6 for the non-positional indices, in which the benchmark income level forms the 
divide; for the positional indices, it is the benchmark position which takes this role.  
 In the case of the Gini coefficient, for which w(i) = (2i – N – 1)/N, q0 = (l - kG*)/(j – kG*) where 
kG* = [N(1+G)+1]/2. The expression for q0  for the extended Gini coefficient G(ν), ν > 1, which is more 
complex, obtains by substituting wG(ν)(i) = N{[(N-i)/N]ν - [(N-i+1)/N]ν} + 1 and M = G(ν) in (12). 
Noting that for large N, wG(ν)(i) ≈ [1 – ν.{(N-i)/N}ν-1]/N, so that q0 can be approximated from (13) as q0 
≈ [(N-kG(ν)* )ν-1 – (N-l)ν-1]/[(N-kG(ν)* )ν-1 – (N-j)ν-1], it follows from the further approximation kG(ν)*  ≈ 
N[1 – {[1 - G(ν)]/ν}1/(ν-1)] already noted that q0 ≈
1
1
1 ( ) (1 )
1 ( ) (1 )
v
l
v
j
G v v p
G v v p
−
−
− − −
− − −  where pj and pl are the ranks of j 
and l respectively. Analogously, for the illfare-ranked S-Gini, q0  ≈
1
-1
1 ( )
1 (
l
j
S p
S p
β
β
β β
β β
−− −
− ) −  for large N. 
 In Table 2, we illustrate for the extended Gini coefficient  how the benchmark position kG(ν)* and 
 
 - 19 - 
maximum permitted rate of leakage 1 – qG(ν) vary with the distributional judgment parameter ν, using 
the same income distribution as in Table 1 and choosing l = 4 and j = 2 as before. The cases 0 < q0 < 1, 
q0 < 0 and q0 > 1 of Theorem 6 all arise. Figure 5 shows the dependence of 1 - qG(ν) on ν graphically, 
for the same four scenarios as used in Figure 4 for 1 - qE(c). As before, we see non-monotonicity in some 
scenarios between ν and 1 - qG(ν). For the positional indices too, then, there can be no general link 
between the degree of lower tail concern of the inequality ordering and the maximum permitted leak.18  
 
v G(v) k* 1 – qG(v) 
Theorem 6, 
case: 
1,2 0,1196 4,4054 0,7464 
1,4 0,2140 4,2976 0,8243 
1,6 0,2894 4,1941 0,8918 
1,8 0,3502 4,0949 0,9499 
2 0,4000 4,0000 1,0000 
(i) 
 
k* > 4 > 2 
  ⇒  0 < q0 < 1 
3 0,5520 3,5895 1,1628 
4 0,6285 3,2724 1,2446 
5 0,6749 3,0244 1,2980 
6 0,7060 2,8249 1,3495 
7 0,7282 2,6607 1,4141 
8 0,7444 2,5225 1,5053 
9 0,7566 2,4046 1,6415 
10 0,7659 2,3026 1,8568 
11 0,7731 2,2135 2,2286 
12 0,7787 2,1351 2,9848 
13 0,7831 2,0655 5,2139 
14 0,7866 2,0034 84,5591 
(ii) 
 
4 > k* > 2 
 
⇒  q0 < 0 
15 0,7893 1,9477 -4,6751 
16 0,7915 1,8975 -2,0133 
17 0,7932 1,8521 -1,1755 
18 0,7946 1,8108 -0,7730 
20 0,7965 1,7386 -0,3936 
25 0,7989 1,6028 -0,1036 
30 0,7996 1,5083 -0,0319 
40 0,8000 1,3866 -0,0033 
(iii) 
 
4 > 2 > k*   
 
⇒  q0 > 1 
 
 
Table 2:  The benchmark position k* and maximum permitted rate of leakage 1-qG(v)  as  
               a function of inequality aversion for the same income distribution ($200, $500, 
               $800, $1100, $2400) when l = 4 and j = 2.  
 
                                                 
18 Yaari’s (1988) equality-mindedness measure concerns a leaky bucket.Yaari suggests a thought experiment whereby the 
incomes of a given fractile of the poor are raised, at the expense of lowering the incomes of a certain fractile of the rich. A 
more equality-minded index M, he argues, would tolerate a bigger fractile of donors than a less equality-minded one, before 
regarding the “leak” entailed as detrimental. Thus his leaks involve a loss of mass, whereas ours involve a loss of income. 
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Panel 1: l = 4  and  j = 2                                                                                        Panel 2: l = 3  and  j = 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Maximum permitted leakage rate 1-qG(v)  for the extended Gini coefficient G(v) as a function of v, for the scenario in Table 1 and three other scenarios 
involving the richest and/or poorest person in the transfer 
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The leakage rates shown in Table 2 and Figure 5 may be compared with those of Duclos (2000, 
p.149-150), who calculates the maximum tolerable leaks for no welfare loss, where welfare is measured 
as µ[1 – G(ν)]. Duclos’s maximum leaks are shown for various scenarios to be increasing in ν and lying 
between 6.7% and 99.6%. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions  
 It is important for economists to be able to compare inequality in income distributions with 
different means. Incomes can change due to growth, and also due to disincentive effects arising from 
the implementation of redistributive programmes. It is perhaps surprising, then, that one can find little 
in the inequality measurement literature about the inequality consequences of a single income growing, 
or of a single leaky transfer. The effects on welfare of such changes have, of course, been much 
discussed; our results in this paper throw light on the corresponding questions for inequality, which we 
believe to be fundamental.   
 First, we looked at the effect on inequality of increasing one income. We confirmed the casual 
intuition that increasing a low income should reduce inequality and increasing a high one should surely 
raise it. In fact we proved that, for large classes of inequality indices, there is a benchmark income level 
or position dividing the two responses, which is different for each inequality index and income 
distribution. This benchmark can be both quantified and systematically related to a property of the 
underlying inequality ordering, its lower tail concern. The intuition for the aggregate, offered up by our 
analysis, that income growth in the lower part of a distribution will be equalizing, and income growth in 
the upper part disequalizing, seems unexceptionable; but it surely has not been appreciated before now 
that the divide between “lower” and “upper” that supports this intuition could differ so markedly for 
different inequality indices, and its determinants be understood.19 
 Second, we turned to the leaky bucket scenario. We took for granted a rate of leakage (1-q) from 
the bucket and asked the question, how leaky would the bucket have to be before the intended 
inequality-ameliorating effect of a single rich-to-poor transfer would be negated? The answer was (1-
q0), with q0 depending on the relative incomes or ranks of the donor and recipient, and, crucially, on 
                                                 
19  Our analytics can in fact be extended to other types of index, for example to the variance of logarithms which, though not Lorenz 
consistent (Foster and Ok, 1999), is popular among applied economists.  Let I be a distributional index in the form I(X) = [1/N]. Σi 
v(xi,b(X)) where v : ℜ+2 → ℜ+ and b: ℜ+N → ℜ+ are differentiable functions. Then ∂Ι/∂xk = [1/N].Σi {v2(xi,b(X)).bk(X) + v1(xk, b(X)}. For  
the variance of logarithms, v(a,b) = [ln(a/b)]2 and b(X) = (Πi xi)1/N = µ%  which is geometric mean income. Then ∂I/∂xk = 2ln(xk/ µ% )/[Nxk], 
whence ∂I/∂xk >< 0 ⇔ xk / µ%   >< 1. Thus the variance of logarithms has a benchmark income level equal to the geometric mean. The leaky 
bucket analytics go similarly: q0 =
j
I(.) x
I(.) x
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
l = 
ln x - ln
(x x )
ln x - ln
j
j
µ
µ
l
l
%
%
. Compare this with (15), and use footnote 17: the analogue of 
Theorem 6 applies with benchmark µ% . 
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which side of the benchmark they are located. We showed that a negative rate of leakage or even one 
exceeding 100% could be tolerated for some configurations. Only in case the donor and recipient are 
both in the lower part of the distribution is there a bound 0 < (1-q0) < 1. So here too, we obtain an 
insight for the aggregate: the inefficiencies of redistributive programmes had better not be focussed 
entirely within the lower part of an income distribution.20   
 A further, major insight arises in the context of tax-transfer policy in a socially heterogeneous 
population, even in the absence of efficiency losses.  Let A and B be two households, selected as the 
donor and recipient for a money transfer respectively. If the equivalence scale deflators for A’s and B’s 
money incomes are mA and mB, each unit reduction in the living standard of A is accompanied by an 
increase of q = mA/mB units in the living standard of B. We can apply Theorems 6 and 7, to examine the 
effect of the (non-leaky) money transfer on inequality in the distribution of living standards, for any 
non-positional or positional index. If B is below the benchmark in the living standards distribution, 
inequality reduction requires q > q0 (where 0 < q0 < 1 if A is also below the benchmark, and q0 < 0 if A 
is above it); and if B is above the benchmark, inequality reduction requires q < q0 (in this case q0 > 1).21 
These results pick up on, and extend, an insight of Glewwe (1991), that some money transfers from the 
better-off to the worse-off can exacerbate inequality. Transfers taking place entirely below the 
benchmark may do this if from a less needy to a very needy type of household (mB > mA/q0, where 0 < 
q0 < 1): we regard this as a strongly counter-intuitive result. Transfers taking place entirely above the 
benchmark may also exacerbate inequality, but only if directed to a very much less needy houshold type 
(mB < mA/q0, where q0 > 1); this seems less unreasonable. Transfers which are made across the 
benchmark are unambiguously  inequality-reducing regardless of relative needs (because q = mA/mB > 
q0 is always satisfied if q0 < 0).   
Although negative rates of “leakage” and rates exceeding 100% have not been encountered in 
leaky bucket analytics addressing the welfare effect of transfers, and may at first sight seem surprising 
in the inequality context, the intuition is, after all, quite straightforward. Tolerance of a leakage 
exceeding 100% (q0 < 0) occurs when donor and “recipient” are either side of the benchmark. Taking 
from a rich person (above the benchmark) unambiguously reduces inequality. This effect is necessarily 
reinforced by giving to a poor person (below the benchmark). Hence, having taken from the rich, one 
can also take from the poor (up to a certain limit, that limit being -q0) without eliminating the inequality 
                                                 
20   In Lambert (1988), a labour supply model was investigated, in which wage rates were lognormally distributed and a piecewise linear 
negative income tax scheme was applied. It was shown that, for a wide range of tax and benefit parameter values, the efficiency loss of 
the tax-transfer system exceeded the size of the bucket. 
21 These requirements stem from (13), which shows that the inequality effect dI of the transfer is a negative or positive function of q 
respectively. 
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gain. Similarly, a negative leak (q0 > 1) is tolerated when the donor and recipient are both above the 
benchmark. Taking $1 from a rich person and giving it to another, less rich but still above the 
benchmark, reduces inequality (by the Principle of Transfers); to restore inequality to the previous 
level, one may give extra to the recipient (namely, an additional amount of q0 - 1). Our analytics have 
enabled these effects to be quantified, understood and compared for wide classes of inequality indices.   
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